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Abstract 
Related party transactions ("RPTs") are frequently used as 
a tool for siphoning off value from a company, but they can 
also be an efficient instrument for assisting firms. The 
trade-off between stopping value-decreasing RPTs and 
promoting value-increasing RPTs requires lawmakers to 
seek an optimal balance, relying on several contingent 
factors. This paper highlights the strong interdependency 
between RPTs regulation and economic changes. After the 
2008 crisis, policymakers have enhanced minority 
shareholders' control over RPTs, considering their 
involvement as the most effective safeguard against 
tunnelling. During the COVID-19 crisis, governments have 
introduced exemptions to the rules on RPTs, even if they 
might weaken minority shareholders' protection. The 
reason is that firms face dramatic liquidity shortfalls due to 
the pandemic, and RPTs can be a vehicle for providing 
finance to distressed companies, avoiding a wave of 
bankruptcies that would be dangerous for the economy. 
Thus, RPTs regulation has been tweaked for adapting to 
the new economic environment, and these legal changes, 
in turn, could affect the economic recovery. 
Keywords: Controllers, Corporate Governance, Economic crisis, 
Liquidity Lifeline, Minority Shareholders 
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Related Party Transactions [hereinafter 'RTPs'] are a typical 
instrument for extracting wealth from a company, notably resulting 
in the expropriation of minority shareholders. At the same time, such 
transactions might be sound business exchanges that bring 
significant benefits for enterprises.  
Between preventing value-reducing RPTs and allowing value-
creating RPTs, there is a tension that cannot be resolved. Therefore, 
lawmakers should try to find the optimal balance for these 
conflicting goals on the policy level, considering that the suitable 
trade-off varies between countries, companies, and time since many 
context-specific factors determine the best solution for any given 
situation. This article argues that the right trade-off crucially 
depends on and should adapt to the economic changes. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers have 
focused on improving non-controlling shareholders' control over 
RPTs, since they found that minority investors lacked adequate tool 
for protecting themselves against abusive RPTs. On the contrary, 
amid the COVID-19 pandemic, governments have enacted 
relaxation or suspension of the RPTs' rules that might reduce 
minority shareholders oversight of RPTs. Due to the economic crisis 
that has followed the COVID-19 outbreak, many companies suffer 
from a severe liquidity shortage. Thereby, it has become essential for 
lawmakers to adopt measures to provide the funding necessary to 
ensure that otherwise solvent enterprises do not go bankrupt. In 
response to this current primary need of the economy, RPTs 
regulation has been tweaked to incentivize controllers to finance 
their distressed firms, even at the cost of increasing the risk of abuse. 
This shows how searching for a balance in the RPTs discipline is 
ongoing as the economy changes.  
In the beginning, the article defines related party transactions, 
distinguishes between value-decreasing and value-increasing RPTs, 
and it describes the different legal strategies used for regulating 
RPTs. It further explains how after the 2008 financial crisis, the 
policymakers' effort has been on enhancing shareholders' oversight 
of RPTs. The author also focuses on the peculiar features of the 




economic crisis triggered by COVID-19, its impacts on the 
enterprises, and the measures adopted during the emergency. 
Finally, the paper examines the exemptions to the RPTs' regulation 
enacted amid the pandemic and their rationale.  
2. Law and Economics of Related Party Transactions 
Related party transactions refer to transactions between a 
corporation and a "related party" 1 , a term of art that comprises 
counterparties who can influence corporate decision-makers, such as 
directors, managers, controlling shareholders, or controlling entities 
(so-called "controllers").  
According to the International Financial Reporting Standards, the 
definition of RPTs encompasses every "transfer of resources, services 
or obligations between a [corporation] and a related party, 
regardless of whether a price is charged"2. Hence, dealings falling 
under this definition involves a wide range of transactions, 
including purchases or sales of assets, goods or services by related 
parties, loans, company guarantees in favour of its parent, 
transactions with close relatives of managers or with companies 
owned by their families, compensation agreements, retirement and 
severance packages, etc. 
RPTs are, per se, legitimate business transactions, or they have at least 
the appearance of a legitimate business transaction3. Nevertheless, 
they involve the very intuitive risk4 of an influential manager or a 
controlling shareholder transacting on terms less favorable for the 
company than could be obtained in an arm's length negotiation, so 
that the transaction is entered into on unfair terms and it translates 
                                                          
1  International Accounting Standards Board, International Accounting 
Standard No. 24.  
2 IAS 24, supra note 1. 
3  L. Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World 
Challenges (With a Critique of the European Commission Proposal), EURPOEAN 
BUSINESS ORGANISATION LAW REVIEW 1 2 (2015). 
4  R. La Porta et al., The law and economics of self-dealing, JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 88(3) (2008). 




into loss for the company 5 . In other words, when vested with 
discretionary powers, the controller will naturally tend to set the 
dealing terms in such a way to foster his interest at the expense of 
that of the company6. For this reason, RPTs are viewed as one of the 
most severe breaches of good corporate governance7. 
2.1. Tunneling and Propping through RPTs 
RPTs are a standard instrument for "tunnelling"8, which covers all 
forms of misappropriation of value (assets, cash flows, or the 
company's equity itself) by corporate insiders. It must be clarified 
that on one side, RPTs do not necessarily involve tunnelling, and on 
the other, tunnelling can be the outcome of behaviour not involving 
RPTs. For example, direct dilution of the investors' claims is a form 
of tunnelling that does not necessarily involve RPTs, since dilution 
can be implemented unilaterally by the corporate controllers. The 
proceeds of tunnelling (i.e. the value extracted from the corporation), 
in turn, are known as private benefits of control9, which identify all 
                                                          
5 A. Habib et al., Related Party Transactions and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence 
From China, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING (2019); Id., Related 
Party Transactions and Audit Fees: Evidence from China, 14, JOURNAL OF 
INTRERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING RESEARCH (2015); Y. L Cheung et al., Buy 
high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions, 
33(5), JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, Elsevier, 914(2009). 
6  A. M. PACCES, RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF CONTROL POWERS, Routledge Research in Corporate 
Law,1, 233-234 (2012). 
7 World Bank, Protecting Minority Shareholders: Frequently Asked Questions, 
(May 2019), 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/protecting-
minority-investors/faq; E. A. Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions: 
Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value, EFA 2004 Maastricht 
Meetings Paper No. 4377, AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper (2004). 
8 S. Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22 (2000); A. Atanasov 
et al., Law And Tunneling, 37 JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW, 1 (2011); id., 
Unbundling and Measuring Tunneling, U. ILL. L. REV. 101 (2014); S. Djankov 
et al., The law and economics of self-dealing, 88 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
ECONOMICS, 430-465 (2008).  
9  M. J. Barclay & C. G. Holderness, Private Benefits of Control in Public 
Corporations, 25 JJFE 371, 374 (1989).  




utilities accruing to a controller that she does not share with (other) 
investors on a pro-rata basis 10 . In companies with concentrated 
ownership – which is the most common ownership structure around 
the world 11  – abusive RPTs consist mainly of expropriations by 
controlling shareholders to the detriment of minority shareholders12. 
Transactions that result in the expropriation of non-controlling 
shareholders are always inefficient for the company that enters into 
them, regardless of whether the related party gains more than the 
company loses13. However, despite their vulnerability to tunnelling 
by corporate insiders, RPTs are never completely prohibited, 
basically for two reasons.  
Firstly, sometimes they are simply unavoidable. For example, 
prohibiting managerial compensation would be absurd since no one 
would agree to work for the corporation for free 14 . Intragroup 
transactions ['IGTs'], as well, are a matter of routine almost inevitable 
within an integrated group15. Besides, they are often economically 
                                                          
10 Pacces supra note 6 at 235. 
11 OECD, Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights, OECD 
Publishing (2012); Z. Goshen & A. Hamdani, Corporate Control and the 
Regulation of Controlling Shareholder 24, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED 
PARTY TRANSACTIONS, L. Enriques & T. H. Tröger eds., (2019); J. R. Franks 
& C. Mayer, Evolution of Ownership and Control Around the World: The 
Changing Face of Capitalism, 33 Working Paper (2017). 
12  S. Y. Kang, Optimally Restrained Tunneling: The Puzzle of Controlling 
Shareholders’ “Generous” Exploitation in Bad-Law Jurisdictions, in THE LAW 
AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 287 (L. Enriques & T. H. 
Tröger eds., 2019). 
13 A. M. Pacces, Procedural and Substantive Review of Related Party 
Transactions. The Case for Noncontrolling Shareholder-Dependent 
Directors,THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 182 (L. 
Enriques & T. H. Tröger eds., 2019). 
14  L. Enriques et al., RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS, THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 146 (R. 
Kraakman et al. eds., 2017). 
15 J. Damman, Related Party Transactions and Intragroup Transactions, THE 
LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 218 (L. Enriques & 
T. H. Tröger eds., 2019); K. J. Hopt, Groups of Companies. A Comparative 
Study on the Economics, Law and Regulation of Corporate Groups, ECGI 




beneficial. Even if the individual transaction is not fair to the 
subsidiary, synergies arising from repeated RPTs or lower 
transactions cost could make both the parent and its subsidiaries 
better off in the longer run16. 
Secondly, RPTs can be efficient transactions conducted in the best 
interest of the individual company, which might even create value 
for all parties involved and the society17. RPTs can replace market 
dealings18, ensuring transaction cost savings19. Compared to arm's 
length transactions, RPTs facilitate better coordination of the 
different activities, and they allow for negotiation and renegotiation 
cost savings. For small firms – which face disproportionate 
transaction costs when dealing with unconnected market 
participants –, directors, officers, and controlling shareholders, are 
often the only parties they can transact with. Moreover, outsiders 
may be unable to evaluate the company's prospects or be subject to 
the revelation of trade secrets or confidential plans that companies 
would better keep for themselves. In contrast, insiders may know 
the company better than an unrelated but distrustful party20. Finally, 
                                                          
(2015); T. H. Tröger, Corporate Groups, A German’s European Perspective, 
SAFE WORKING PAPER NO. 66 (2014); P.-H. Conac, Director’s Duties in 
Groups of Companies – Legaliyzing the Interest of the Group at the European 
Level, ECFR (2013). 
16 Enriques (2015) supra note 3.  
17 D. H. Downs et al., Related Party Transactions and Firm Value: Evidence from 
Property Markets in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, 52 J. REAL ESTATE 
FINAN. ECON. 408 (2016); R. M. K. Wong et al., Are Related-Party Sales 
Value-Adding or Value-Destroying? Evidence from China, 26 J. INT’L FINAN. 
MGMT. & ACCT. 1 (2015); M. Ryngaert & S. Thomas, Not All Related Party 
Transactions (RPTs) Are the Same: Ex-ante Versus Ex-post RPTs, 50 J. ACCT. 
RES. 845 (2012). 
18 K. S. Kim, Related Party Transactions in East Asia,THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 287 (L. Enriques & T. H. Tröger eds., 2019). 
19 R. H. Coase, The nature of the firm, 4 ECONOMETRICA N. S. 386-4040 (1937). 
20 Damman, supra note 15. 




RPTs could provide for funding that would not be available on 
regular capital markets21.  
It could even happen that an RPT is entered into favourable terms 
for the corporation and unfavourable ones for the related party if the 
latter has an interest in supporting the former (so-called 
"propping"22), which might be even only to keep extracting private 
benefits of control from it in the future23. A private controller can 
equally engage in propping, either using a partly-owned subsidiary 
to prop up a distressed one or injecting some money from her own 
pockets24. When the assistance comes from other sister firms within 
the corporate group, it is simply the flip side of tunnelling because 
resources are transferred from one company within the group (the 
victim of tunnelling) to another (the beneficiary of propping). When 
the controlling shareholder herself supports control firms, this 
benefits both minority investors and creditors, and, usually, it does 
not decrease social welfare in the private sectors25. For example, a 
controlling shareholder might use RPTs to "prop up" a controlled 
firm on the verge of bankruptcy by lending to it at a below-market 
(or even zero) interest rate. 
                                                          
21 R. W. Masulis et al., Family Business Groups around the World: Financing 
Advantages, Control Motivations, and Organizational Choices, 24 REVIEW OF 
FINANCIAL STUDIES, 3556 (2011). 
22 E. Friedman et al., Propping and Tunneling, 31 J. COMP. ECON., 4, 732 (2003); 
M. Jian & T.J. Wong, Propping through Related Party Transactions, REVIEW 
OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES, 70–105 (2010); Y.L. Cheung et al., Tunneling, 
Propping, and Expropriation: Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in 
Hong Kong, 82 J. FIN. ECON, 343 (2006). 
23 Friedman, supra note 22. 
24 L. Enriques & T. H. Tröger, The Law and (Some) Finance of Related Party 
Transactions. An Introduction, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY 
TRANSACTIONS 5-6 (L. Enriques & T. H. Tröger eds., 2019). 
25 C. J. Milhaupt & M. Pargendler, Related Party Transactions in State-Owned 
Enterprises. Tunneling, Propping, and Policy Channeling, THE LAW AND 
FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 248 (L. Enriques & T. H. 
Tröger eds., 2019). 




2.2. Legal Strategies for Regulating RPTs 
Corporate lawmakers resort to a wide range of legal strategies to 
prevent RPTs from being used for tunnelling purposes without 
stifling beneficial transactions. However, they mainly fall into three 
groups: mandatory disclosure, procedural requirements, and ex-post 
judicial review.  
Mandatory disclosure is a widely used technique to address RPTs26, 
even though the regulatory intensity varies27. Mandatory disclosure 
alerts shareholders and the market to RPTs, but in isolation is 
insufficient to prevent tunnelling 28 . Its importance is more in 
supporting internal decision-makers independence. They will act 
more assertively if they know the RPT they may approve will be 
subject to public scrutiny and facilitate private and public 
enforcement against tunnelling29.  
Most jurisdictions provide for procedural requirements when 
entering into RPTs. The primary method is the board approval and 
particularly the approval by disinterested or independent directors. 
The involvement of disinterested/independent directors has several 
virtues: compliance is (relatively) cheap; fair, value-increasing 
transactions are likely to be approved; disinterested directors might 
question suspect related-party transactions 30 . The high costs are 
specular. Primarily, directors can play an influential role in 
protecting the minority shareholders only if they can be expected to 
act genuinely independently from controllers 31 . Nevertheless, 
substantial independence is not guaranteed since, for the most part, 
they are selected with the (interested) consent of top executive 
officers, controlling shareholders, or both 32 . Lastly, disinterested 
directors might have insufficient knowledge of a company's 
                                                          
26 Enriques (2015), supra note 3. 
27 Enriques et al., supra note 14. 
28 Y. L. Cheung et al., Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in 
related party transactions, JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE (2009). 
29 Enriques et al., supra note 14, at 147. 
30 Id. at 153.  
31 Enriques & Tröger, supra note 24, at 11. 
32 Enriques et al., supra note 14, at 153. 




business and organizational structures that would allow insiders to 
opportunistically filter information, thereby distorting the decision-
making process to their advantage33.  
As an alternative or complement to disinterested board approval of 
RPTs, some jurisdictions require or encourage shareholders' 
approval, particularly "Majority Of the Minority" [hereinafter 
'MOM'] approval. After all, while outside directors are at best 
disinterested, shareholders are affirmatively interested in preserving 
corporate value34. Thereby, MOM could empower non-controlling 
shareholders to look after their interests, negotiating improved 
terms35. However, there are some concerns about MOM approval. It 
is a cumbersome and costly instrument, which is why jurisdictions 
that provide for MOM approval usually do so only for RPTs above 
a given size36. Shareholders often have neither the right incentives 
nor the necessary expertise37. Its reasoning runs counter to the logic 
of delegated management that characterizes the corporate form38.  
Since directors are usually more knowledgeable about business 
transactions, whereas shareholders have better incentives to stop 
tunnelling to their disadvantage, synergies could derive from the 
combination of the two procedural safeguards39.  
Jurisdictions usually rely also on ex-post judicial review for tackling 
RPTs. There are various ex-post standard-based reviews of RPTs, but 
they can be divided into procedural reviews or substantive reviews. 
The former would validate the transaction if it were approved with 
due process. The latter evaluates the RPT in comparison with a 
market transaction concluded at arm's length40. Jurisdictions may 
also apply different standards of review to different RPTs. For 
                                                          
33 Enriques (2015), supra note 3, at 21; Enriques & Tröger, supra note 24, at 9. 
34 Enriques et al., supra note 14, at 156. 
35 Z. Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets 
Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 402(2003).  
36 Enriques (2015), supra note 3. 
37 Kim, supra note 18. 
38 Enriques et al., supra note 14, at 156. 
39 Pacces (2019), supra note 13, 200; Enriques (2015), supra note 3, at 22. 
40 Pacces (2019), supra note 13. 




example, corporate law in many countries provides for more lenient 
standards when RPTs also qualify as intra-group transactions, given 
they are routine, repeat transactions, the individual review of which 
by courts would be practically incompatible with the very group 
business form41. In any case, functionally, a standard of review needs 
to be combined with effective enforcement. Yet, the strictness of 
enforcement and courts' ability to understand and evaluate business 
transactions vary significantly42. 
Policymakers have responded in many different ways for dealing 
with RPTs. However, none of the techniques described above, nor a 
combination of them, can guarantee that only value-increasing RPTs 
proceed while value-decreasing transactions are stopped. This, 
because there is an inevitable trade-off between promoting the 
former and curbing the latter. Therefore, the goal is to identify an 
optimal regime for RPTs in terms of effectiveness (i.e. ability to stop 
value-decreasing RPTs) and efficiency (i.e. allowing value-increasing 
RTPs to proceed)43. The effectiveness and the efficiency of a strategy 
vary between countries, companies, and time since they are strictly 
correlated to contextual factors (like geographical and cultural 
differences, corporations' industry and size), institutional 
infrastructures, economic and political environment 44 . A 
fundamental role is played by governance models, governance 
practices (like board approval, independent directors' involvement, 
                                                          
41 Enriques (2015), supra note 3, at 26. 
42  Enriques et al., supra note 14, at 161. For Delaware case law see 
Weinberger v. UOP, 7, Corp. L. Rev. 195, 196 (1984); Kahn v. Lynch 
Communication Systems, Inc, Supreme Court of Delaware, 1994, 638 A.2d 
1110; Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., in 88 A.3d 635 ss. (Del. 2014). In 
Italy, see the “Parmalat Case”: Trib. Parma, 29 marzo 2013 (decr.), Giur. 
comm., 2014, II, pp. 95 ss.; Trib. Parma, 11 novembre 2013 (decr.); App. 
Bologna, 26 maggio 2014 (decr.), Giur. comm., 2015, II, pp. 1012 ss.; and 
the “Fondiaria-Sai Case”: Trib. Milano, 20 dicembre 2013 (ord.), nonché 
Trib. Milano, 20 febbraio 2015 (ord), www.giurisprudenzadelleimprese.it. 
43 Pacces (2019), supra note 13. 
44  M. Pizzo, Related party transactions under a contingency perspective, 17 
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & GOVERNANCE No. 2, 319-320 (2013). 




external appraisal, etc.), and ownership structure 45 , which differ 
among countries as well, preventing from automatically translating 
to others or considering as generally valid conclusion supported by 
empirical evidence in one jurisdiction46. Finally, no regulation of 
RPTs can succeed in impeding tunnelling in the absence of effective 
enforcement mechanisms47. As a result of this, RPTs rules should not 
be examined in isolation on a stand-alone basis, but it is necessary to 
evaluate their relations with these factors and the manners in which 
they are enforced by regulators and adhered to by market 
participants.  
3. RPTs Regulation after the 2008 Crisis 
The 2008 financial crisis showed some significant shortcomings in 
corporate governance, especially of financial institutions 48 . 
According to several authorities, failures of corporate governance 
were a vital cause of the crisis49. Notably, it represented the failure 
                                                          
45 M. Lemmon, & K. V. Lins, Ownership structure, corporate governance, and 
firm value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, JOURNAL OF 
FINANCE, 58, 1445–1468 (2003); M. Bertrand et al., Ferreting out tunneling: 
An application to Indian business groups, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS, 117(1), 121–148 (2002); M. Kang, The Association between 
Related-Party Transactions and Control-Ownership Wedge: Evidence from 
Korea, 29 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 272 (2014). 
46 D. W. Puchniak & U. Varottil, Related Party Transactions in Commonwealth 
Asia. Complexity Revealed, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY 
TRANSACTIONS 343-344 (L. Enriques & T. H. Tröger eds., 2019). 
47 Enriques (2015), supra note 3. 
48 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs OECD Steering Group on 
Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis. 
Conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the 
Principles, OECD publishing (2010). 
49 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, (2011); J. De Larosie ̀re, Report of the High-Level Group 
on Financial Supervision in the EU, (2009); ASSOCIATION OF CHARTERED 
CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, CLIMBING OUT OF THE CREDIT CRUNCH. 
ASSOCIATION OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, LONDON, (2008); G. 




of the shareholder-owner model who contributes to the company's 
long-term viability50. Most of the incentives encouraged financial 
institutions' managers to act on a short-term perspective and make 
as much profit as possible to the detriment of credit quality and 
prudence51. Shareholders as well showed little interest in the long-
term governance objectives of the businesses in which they invested. 
Instead, they seemed to encourage excessive risk-taking given their 
relatively short (or even very short) investment horizons52. Thus, 
appropriate shareholder engagement has started to be viewed as 
"the linchpin of an effective corporate governance framework"53.  
Not surprisingly, RPTs have been at the centre of the debate on 
corporate governance that followed the financial crisis. Minority 
shareholder's protection and engagement are highly relevant in 
relation to the role of shareholders in corporate governance54, and 
RPTs – especially after the corporate scandals of the 2000s55 – are 
considered the primary vehicle for controlling shareholders to 
extract private benefits of control to the detriment of minority 
shareholders56. That is why "Financial economists, legal scholars, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and 
                                                          
Kirkpatrick, Corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis, OECD 
PUBLISHING, (2009). 
50  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GREEN PAPER. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND REMUNERATION POLICIES, BRUSSELS, (2010). 
51 J. De Larosie ̀re, Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision EU, 
BRUSSELS (25 February 2009).  
52 European Commission, supra note 50. 
53 C. Van der Elst & E. P.M. Vermeulen, Europe’s Corporate Governance Green 
Paper: Rethinking Shareholder Engagement, THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL 
MARKET IN TRANSITION, 200 (H. S. Birkmose et al. eds., 2012). 
54  L. ENRIQUES ET AL., THE BASIC GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE: MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS AND NON-SHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCIES, THE ANATOMY 
OF CORPORATE LAW. A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 79 (R. 
Kraakman et al. eds., 2017). 
55 In the U.S.: In Re Enron 235 F Supp. 2d 549 U.S (2002) and SEC v 
WorldCom Inc 273 F Supp 2d 431 (2003). In Italy, see the Parmalat case 
supra note 42.  
56  European Commission, Green Paper. The EU corporate governance 
framework, Brussels, 5.4.2011 COM(2011) 164 final.  




others have urged lawmakers to subject certain self-dealing 
transactions to a vote by 'disinterested' shareholders" 57 . 
Policymakers have also started to consider direct minority 
shareholder involvement as the most effective procedural safeguard 
against tunnelling. Therefore, an increasing number of countries 
have provided or tried to provide for such a requirement with 
respect to larger, non-routine transactions58. This can be observed in 
the measures taken in both India and the EU. 
3.1. The European Union 
At the European Union level, in 2014, the Commission presented a 
proposal of directive amending Directive 2007/36/EC (so-called 
"Shareholder rights Directive", or "SRD") aimed at improving 
shareholders' control over RPTs. The Commission claimed that RPTs 
create the opportunity to appropriate value belonging to the 
company to the detriment of shareholders and notably minority 
shareholders. Additionally, it found that minority investors still 
lacked access to sufficient information and adequate tools to protect 
themselves against abusive RPTs. For this reason, the Proposal 
required listed companies to submit significant transactions to a vote 
by the shareholders in a general meeting, not allowing the company 
to conclude the transaction before the shareholders' approval59. 
This rule received several critiques. First, shareholders should be 
involved only on an exceptional basis since calling a shareholder 
meeting to affirm the corporation's significant transactions with its 
                                                          
57 A. Hamdani & Y.Yafeh, Institutional Investors As Minority Shareholders, 
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 137 (L. Enriques 
& T. H. Tröger eds., 2019). 
58 Enriques (2015), supra note 3, at 17; Enriques & Tröger, supra note 24, at 
12; Enriques et al., supra note 14, at 156-57. 
59 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the 
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU 
as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, Brussels, 
9.4.2014 COM(2014), art. 9c(2). 




dominant shareholder is particularly expensive60. Second, it would 
slow down corporate decisions, and it could inadvertently give 
sensitive information to a competitor61. Third, it could transfer too 
many powers from boards to shareholders, giving minority 
shareholders an unwarranted potential for applying pressure 62 . 
Fourth, approval would be granted at the end of a negotiation 
process that member states were free to leave in the hands of 
interested agents when any other alternative might be worth less 
than the transaction itself63. Fifth, the proposed rule offered a single 
model irrespective of ownership structure and different national 
experiences 64 . Yet, alternative arrangements could work more 
effectively where the particularities of the corporate law 
environment are such that the regulation creates high costs65. Finally, 
the rule rested on the contestable presumption of minority 
shareholders' willingness and capacity to serve as effective 
                                                          
60 C. Di Noia, European Company Law and Related Party Transactions. The EU 
legal framework, in CONVEGNO DI DIRITTO SOCIETARIO EUROPEO E 
OPERAZIONI CON PARTI CORRELATE, (2014); T. H. Tröger, Corporate groups: 
A German's European perspective, SAFE Working Paper, No. 66, Goethe 
University Frankfurt, SAFE, 29 (2014). 
61 Business Europe and European Issuers, Business message on the upcoming 
committee vote on the shareholder rights proposal, 28 April 2015, 
https://www.businesseurope.eu/sites/buseur/files/media/imported/
2015-00342-E.pdf.  
62  European Banking Federation, EBF comments on the Revision of the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive, 23 September 2014, http://www.ebf-
fbe.eu/position/ebf-comments-revision-shareholders-rights-directive-
remuneration-related-party-transactions/. 
63 Enriques (2015), supra note 3, at 32. 
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counterweights to controlling shareholders' detrimental influence 
when vested with a right to vote on RPTs66. Nevertheless, there is a 
variety of minority shareholders and not all of them have the 
capability or the incentives for exercising an active role67. Moreover, 
MOM approval might function differently in the presence of 
different shareholders68.  
Given the strong disapproval surrounding the RPTs' regulation, 
later presidency compromise texts69 and the European Parliament 
Proceedings' outcome70 altered the initial proposal, no longer setting 
a uniform European standard71. More in details, new Article 9c of 
the SRD – introduced by Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder 
engagement ("SRD2") – leaves discretion to the member states in 
determining whether material RPTs are to be approved by the board, 
the shareholders or the supervisory body. The final rule is the 
outcome of a severe retreat from the European Commission's initial 
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proposal, which imposed shareholders' approval as a mandatory 
procedural requirement72 . However, the process that lead to the 
adoption of the SRD2 gives clear evidence that the RPTs discipline is 
not consistent with standardization and harmonization of rules, 
requiring rather a flexible approach that allows adapting firstly to 
different corporate governance models. 
3.2. India 
A similar evolution of the RPTs regulation can be seen in India.  In 
the Indian legal system, which is characterized by concentrated 
ownership and the widespread use of company groups, RPTs are 
very common and significant. The financial crisis and some scandals, 
such as the Satyam fraud of late 2008, which involved abusive RPTs 
approved by independent directors, suggested the need for further 
measures aimed at protecting minority shareholders73. Thus, in 2013 
a new Companies Act has been adopted, replacing the 1956 
Companies Act. 
The Companies Act was "unprecedented, regarding the power 
granted to minority shareholders to reject RPTs 74 . In its original 
form, section 188 of the Act mandated a MOM vote of shareholders 
through a special resolution, which required shareholders' approval 
holding 75% votes among those present and voting75. The rationale 
was that the concentrated shareholding in the hands of the 
promoters in India had enormous scope for potential abuse 
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regarding RPT's76. Historically, India has had systematic problems 
with RPTs being abused by controlling shareholders (i.e. promoters); 
therefore, the legislator identified the latter's accountability to 
minority shareholders as the heart of the problem77.  
However, the companies' representations advocated that such 
regulations were hampering business operations’ efficiency because 
too cumbersome and often impractical to obtain78. Consequently, at 
first, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs ("MCA") through two 
circulars substantially diluted Section 188 of the Companies Act's 
provisions. The first circular narrowed the definition of a "Related 
party" for the purpose of voting on resolutions, enabling a large set 
of shareholders who are likely to benefit but are not "related" to vote 
on RPT resolutions. The second circular required to seek shareholder 
approval for only those RPTs which cross a certain threshold, and it 
exempted companies from seeking shareholder approvals for RPTs 
with whole subsidiaries 79 . Additionally, the 2015 Companies 
Amendment Act has established that RPTs only need shareholder 
approval through an "ordinary resolution", reducing the 
requirement to a simple majority vote (i.e., with the support of more 
than 50% votes among shareholders present and voting)80. These 
moves have received acceptance from India's business community81, 
but they have further decreased the power of minority shareholders 
to block abusive RPTs. The problem has been worsened by India's 
challenges in enforcing corporate governance norms due to 
inadequate enforcement machinery available to the regulators and 
to an overburdened court system82. The result is that behind many 
corporate frauds there is still a strong role of related party 
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transactions83. For this reason, the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India appointed a Working Group that on 27 January 2020 proposed 
a recommendation for strengthening the monitoring and 
enforcement of rules on RPTs84. 
3.3. The “political effect” on RPTs 
On one side, these interventions show that RPTs regulation is 
sensitive and reacts to the political pressures that arise after an 
economic crisis85 . Populist reforms after a scandal or crisis are a 
typical "political effect" on corporate law. During and after a crisis, 
lawmakers feel strong from the electorate to implement reforms, so 
they respond by "doing something" for the sake of it rather than 
because something genuinely needs to be done. Moreover, their 
interventions' content is determined by what generally appeals, 
which may differ from what will solve the underlying economic 
problems. On the other side, they demonstrate that RPTs rules 
cannot be evaluated in isolation from the specific context in which 
they need to be applied or without considering the actual economic 
rationale behind them. The shareholders' approval mechanism has a 
solid theoretical foundation, and it is consistent with the political 
climate about the issue that followed the corporate scandals and the 
financial crisis. However, like any other a priori theoretical choice, it 
might lead to unsatisfactory results, not reach the planned targets, 
or even turn out to be harmful when it interacts with a given 
jurisdiction's contingent factors. 
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4. COVID-19 and Corporate Law 
SARS-CoV-2 (referred to also as COVID-19 or coronavirus) is first a 
human tragedy that has provoked an unprecedented public health 
crisis. At the same time, the pandemic has generated a significant 
economic crisis. With a halt in production and restrictions on a wide 
range of activities in many countries, travel bans, a collapse in 
consumption and confidence, and turmoil in stock exchanges, 
coronavirus has "frozen up" the economic activity, causing a massive 
contraction of the global economy. The International Monetary Fund 
has forecasted a 4.9% decline in global GDP in 2020, with 
considerable further downward risk86. Other commentators suggest 
a worse scenario where developed countries' GDP will drop by 
between 15 and 30% within the last quarter of 2019 and the second 
quarter of 202087.  
COVID-19 is different from the previous crisis, representing a shock 
to the economy the likes of which no one has ever seen88. In contrast 
with the 2008 financial crisis, the coronavirus outbreak has not 
affected just isolated economic sectors, but it is threatening most of 
them, on both the supply and the demand sides89. On the supply 
side, there is a direct reduction in the supply of labour from unwell 
workers, from caregivers who have to take care of kids because of 
school closures, increased mortality, and workers who cannot work. 
An even larger effect on economic activity occurs because of the 
contagion containment measures, which have led to a drop in 
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capacity utilization and have lowered production. Furthermore, 
supply chains get severed since firms that rely on them may have 
been unable to get the parts they need, whether domestically or 
internationally. Together, these disruptions have contributed to a 
rise in business costs and constitute a negative productivity shock, 
reducing economic activity. On the demand side, the loss of income, 
fear of contagion, heightened uncertainty, and the forced change in 
consumption patterns resulting from health-related measures make 
consumers and businesses spend less. 
Moreover, most of the worst global recessions over the past six 
decades have been caused either by exogenous economic shocks or 
by severe financial sector problems that turned into banking crises. 
The COVID crisis does not originate from the financial sector, but it 
is spreading "from the bottom up". Banks, which in the 2008 global 
financial crisis were demonized for their irresponsible behavior, are 
not part of the problem, and to the contrary, they should be part of 
the solution90. Instead, the risk has migrated to the non-bank part of 
the financial system, namely, traditional investors such as pension 
funds, insurance, mutual funds, and newer investors such as hedge 
funds and private equity. Furthermore, differently from a "normal" 
recession, this crisis does not discriminate, since rather than simply 
clearing out less productive firms, it also results in the death of many 
good firms91. Eventually, both authorities and businesses have to 
deal with a considerably higher-than-usual degree of uncertainty 
around the forecasts, the pandemic itself, its macroeconomic fallout, 
and the associated stresses in financial and commodity markets92.  
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4.1. Companies' Liquidity Shortfalls   
Companies' main issue is that the dramatic and sudden income loss 
has caused them severe liquidity shortages. The pandemic outbreak 
and related emergency measures implemented to tackle the health 
crisis have made it difficult for many enterprises to meet their 
financial obligations. Many of the fixed costs, like rents and interest 
payments, remain due, whereas the cash flow destined to meet these 
obligations has been severely impacted. As a result, many otherwise 
sound firms face acute liquidity problems that might eventually 
become solvency problems93. Nevertheless, it must be avoided that 
liquidity pressures evolve into solvency pressures because it would 
convert a temporary shock into a decline in long-run economic 
performance94. As it has been underlined, "the biggest threat to the 
economy is that viable businesses become illiquid and go bust"95.  
Consistently, the focus of governments around the world has been 
on taking action to address companies' liquidity shortfalls. For 
example, they have introduced: insolvency relief tools to keep 
distressed firms out of formal insolvency proceedings or at least to 
delay them, gaining valuable time to facilitate the restructuring and 
corporate workouts 96 ; allowances for deferred payments, rent 
reductions, interest rates reductions, and subsidy increases, tax relief 
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or a moratorium on debt repayments, to ease liquidity constraints97; 
temporary public guarantees for banking loans, that are playing a 
prominent role for ensuring businesses' access to finance amid the 
emergency98. 
In the domain of corporate law, governments have enacted 
temporary amendments that, following a "survival first" imperative, 
provide for more flexible and speedy capital measures to keep 
companies afloat99. For example, some countries have stipulated that 
dividends can only be disbursed following a shareholders' in favour 
thereof. Moreover, regulators worldwide have called for a prudent 
approach to share buybacks as well, given the potential liquidity 
stress and the effects on internal and external stakeholders, due to 
the partial or complete stop of operations of many organizations. In 
some countries, to ease speedy recapitalization, the majority 
necessary for capital measures (capital increases, capital decreases, 
conditional, etc.) has been lowered, the acquisition of shares by 
funds has been allowed at terms lower than current market prices, 
and procedural terms have been shortened and lightened. Others 
have relaxed shareholders pre-emption rights on newly issued 
shares, shortening the time it takes to execute a capital increase 
resolution and attracting investors willing to prop up the company 
via an equity capital injection. 
                                                          
97 Y. Huang et al., Saving China from the coronavirus and economic meltdown: 
Experiences and lessons, in Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast 
and Do Whatever It Takes, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH (R. 
Baldwin & B. Weder di Mauro eds., 2020). 
98 G. Gobbi et al., Unintended effects of loan guarantees during the COVID-19 
crisis, VoxEU.org., April 15, 2020. 
99 D. A. Zetzsche et al., The COVID-19-Crisis and Company Law - Towards 
Virtual Shareholder Meetings, UNIVERSITY OF LUXEMBOURG FACULTY OF 
LAW, ECONOMICS & FINANCE WPS 2020-007 (2020); L. Enriques, Pandemic-
Resistant Corporate Law: How to Help Companies Cope with Existential Threats 
and Extreme Uncertainty During the COVID-19 Crisis, EUROPEAN COMPANY 
AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW (Forthcoming), European Corporate 
Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 530/23020, (June 29, 
2020).  




5. RPTs Regulation during COVID-19  
Against this backdrop, suspension or relaxation of rules on related 
party transactions has been introduced. 
5.1. The United Kingdom 
On 8 April, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Financial 
Conduct Authority ("FCA") announced a series of temporary 
measures to help listed companies access capital through equity 
fundraisings 100 . They also cover alternatives to general meeting 
approval for related party transactions, recognizing that during the 
pandemic there are several challenges for companies in convening a 
general meeting that could jeopardize their ability to complete 
critical fundraising quickly. To help address those challenges, the 
FCA has modified the Listing Rules' application so that premium 
listed companies can apply to the FCA for dispensation from the 
requirement to hold a general meeting where shareholder approval 
is required for related party transactions. To receive the 
dispensation, issuers need to have obtained written undertakings 
from shareholders that they approve the proposed transaction and 
would vote in favour of a resolution to approve the transaction if a 
general meeting were to be held. Moreover, issuers need to obtain a 
sufficient number of undertakings to meet the relevant threshold for 
obtaining shareholder approval. Finally, when the requisite number 
of written undertakings is obtained, the issuer must inform the 
market. 
Even though the measures on RPTs do not go as far as it was hoped, 
they still provide some additional flexibility to companies who need 
to raise additional funding to shore up their balance sheet because 
of the crisis101. 
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5.2. The United States 
In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has 
temporarily waived or suspended specific rules 102 , reflecting the 
New York Stock Exchange's ("NYSE") expectation that many listed 
companies need to access additional capital that may not be 
available in the public equity or credit markets. 
Particularly, to meet the growing liquidity needs caused by COVID-
19, the SEC approved new temporary Section 312.03T of the NYSE 
Listed Company Manual, allowing NYSE-listed companies – from 
14 May 2020, through 30 June 2020, and subject to specified 
conditions – to issue securities to related parties (i.e. officers, 
directors, employees, and consultants) without shareholder 
approval.    
The rule facilitates the quick raising of capital during the pandemic 
from individual investors or small groups of investors, including 
existing shareholders and related parties103.  
5.3. Italy 
In Italy, Consob – which is the public authority responsible for 
regulating the Italian financial markets – has amended its regulation 
on related party transactions for listed companies, temporarily 
broadening the scope of provision relaxing procedural requirements 
in the presence of urgency reasons104. Namely, it provides that the 
special regime for the urgent transaction shall apply by default 
rather than by opt-in via a corporate charter clause to facilitate the 
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exemption option in urgent capital strengthening operations 
involving related parties. 
More in details, the option (already provided for by the regulations 
in force since 2011) allows companies on the reasons of urgency to 
derogate from the procedural requirements for the approval of 
RPTs, provided that adequate public information is given on the 
transaction and that shareholders are allowed to express themselves 
on the transaction during the first helpful meeting. Yet, the Consob 
regulation requires companies to provide in advance for the 
exemption in the case of urgent transactions both in the articles of 
company statutes and in the procedures for carrying out RPTs. The 
resolution adopted in response to COVID-19 makes it possible until 
30 June 2021 to use the provisions expressly dictated for urgent cases 
by companies that have not provided for this option in their 
procedures and/or in their articles of association. According to 
Consob, the simplification intervention could affect more than 60% 
of the companies currently listed, which have not provided for the 
exemption in the case of urgency or have provided for it only 
partially (only for operations about the administrative or delegated 
body or only for those about shareholders)105. Since in the event of 
operations falling within the competencies of the shareholders' 
meeting the implementation of the mentioned exemption is possible 
only in cases of urgency "connected to corporate crises", Consob has 
also specified that, until 30 June 2021, the need to deal with 
emergency cases related to the pandemic sets up an emergency case 
related to corporate crises106. 
Besides, the "Liquidity Decree" (released 8 April 2020 and converted 
into Law no. 40, dated 5 June 2020) has suspended – between 9 April 
2020 and 31 December 2020 – the corporate law provisions on equity 
subordination for shareholders' loans and loans granted by entities 
exercising management and coordination activities. Under Article 
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2467 and 2497-quinquies, the Italian civil code sets out a general rule 
(extensively applied by courts) of equitable subordination of loans 
made by shareholders and intra-group loans. More in details, the 
articles provided that loans granted by shareholders and/or by other 
group companies under centralized "management coordination 
activity" are subordinated to the repayment of the other creditors if 
at the time the loan is advanced there is an imbalance between the 
company's indebtedness and its net asset value, or the company's 
financial situation would require an equity contribution instead of a 
loan. The rule is aimed at discouraging the so-called 
undercapitalization of companies. Yet, in the current situation where 
enterprises need new finance, such a mechanism represented a 
significant disincentive for shareholders that are likely to be the most 
immediate funding entities. The provision of the Liquidity Decree 
thereby incentivizes shareholders' injection of fresh financial 
resources into companies. 
5.4. RPTs' as an Instrument for Propping Companies during 
COVID-19 
Under Section 3 we have seen how, after the 2008 crisis, lawmakers 
have generally introduced and tightened rules on related party 
transactions, particularly to enhance minority shareholders' 
protection. 
Instead, the exemptions to RPTs rules enacted during the COVID-19 
pandemic might decrease shareholders' oversight of RPTs, while 
increasing the risk of expropriation by the controllers to the 
detriment of minority shareholders.  
Notwithstanding, these exemptions can facilitate the channel of 
funding to distressed companies that are facing a severe liquidity 
shortage. As explained above, there are situations in which 
controlling shareholders are in the best position to provide cheap 
finance to an ailing firm. The suspension or relaxation of rules on 
RPTs that considerably lengthen the decision-making process or that 
support recapitalization of firms using shareholders' loans gives the 
controllers an incentive to "prop up" their distressed companies. 
When the need for liquidity is urgent, and the avoidance of a wave 




of insolvencies is in the public interest107, these kinds of exemptions 
about RPTs can be encouraged, even at the cost of intensifying the 
risk of abuse108. In other words, in a "survival first" mode, it seems 
acceptable to sacrifice a tool for the minority shareholders' protection 
to keep companies afloat.  
In the trade-off between curbing tunnelling via RPTs and allowing 
propping via RPTs, corporate law scholarship generally focuses on 
the need to protect minority shareholders from controller 
opportunism. Yet, effective regulation of RPTs must also include 
strategies for preserving the advantages deriving from value-
creating RPTs. The right balance between the two goals crucially 
depends on the economic environment. Hence, any severe crisis or 
significant economic event triggers a response in RPTs regulation, 
which has to be tailor-made as each crisis is different.  
As Figure 1 illustrates graphically, the 2008 crisis and the COVID-19 
crisis pose different issues concerning RPTs, which justify different 
kind of interventions. 
In 2008, corporate governance failures were among the causes of the 
crisis, while they have nothing to do with the COVID-19 outbreak. 
After the global financial crisis, governments enacted regulations 
aimed at preventing a future crisis. With respect to RPTs, this meant 
designing rules for preventing tunnelling and increasing minority 
shareholders' protection. During COVID-19 instead, lawmakers are 
laying out interventions for resolving the crisis, addressing the central 
problem the pandemic is provoking to businesses: lack of liquidity. 
Therefore, the exemptions to the current RPTs regulations are 
directed to incentivize controllers to prop up their companies 
through RPTs. 
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However, these exemptions are examples of temporary corporate 
law interventions for countering the emergency109, and this has some 
implications. First, adopting company law measures during a crisis 
requires some caution. It is better to opt for the simplest form of 
intervention, such as regulatory exemption or waiver powers, and to 
provide flexibility in implementation. The rule tweaks should be 
proportionate, deviating from the corporate law that applies in 
normal conditions as slight as possible. Emergency measures should 
have a clear and reasonable end date, allowing to duly ponder the 
need to extend their validity and to reduce the risk of them staying 
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in force for longer than needed 110 . Second, these are emergency 
corporate law rules enacted to allow companies to survive. Hence, 
the same rules could play out differently in normal times, becoming 
ineffective or even counterproductive. Thereby, once the liquidity 
crisis prompted by the pandemic is over, it will be necessary to 
discuss the merits of the emergency corporate law rules again, likely 
going back to regular times protections or anyway adapting them to 
the new economic scenario.  
6. Conclusion 
A lesson for the future to be learned from the current pandemic 
emergency is the positive contribution RPTs can give during a 
liquidity crisis. When – as during COVID-19 – banks are reluctant to 
lend to firms due to the probability of default and the likely 
deterioration underway in their balance sheets 111 , and there is a 
significant contraction in the supply of equity capital as well112, RPTs 
can provide a liquidity lifeline. Financing from the controllers can 
create significant advantages by supporting those firms that could 
otherwise find it difficult to attract external funding and by lowering 
the cost of raising capital113. Consequently, even if a certain level of 
expropriation is anticipated, the dominant shareholder's finance can 
still be an optimal choice due to its offsetting benefits, which are 
especially advantageous when facing a dramatic liquidity shortfall. 
Moreover, when the controlling shareholder is a "stationary 
controller", it usually has a long-term interest in the controlled 
corporation. Therefore, it is in its own best interest to voluntarily 
reduce the degree of expropriation from minority shareholders114. 
Beyond COVID-19, the incidence of RPTs is significantly affected 
(among other things) by the existing share ownership structure and 
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by the economic environment. In most jurisdictions around the 
world, the ownership of shares is concentrated in controlling 
shareholders' hands. Thus, when the economic downturns result in 
a credit crunch from the banking system and a decline in equity 
finance, the controlling shareholder's funds might be the only viable 
solution.  
As noted above, usually the focus of corporate law doctrine and 
policy is almost exclusively on protecting investors from controllers’ 
agency costs, namely controllers’ self-dealing. Instead, in times of 
economic stress it is right to incentivize the financing transactions 
with the controllers, even if this requires courts and lawmakers to 
tolerate some level of self-dealing. Then, if there is any form of abuse, 
it is preferable to deal with it by ex post review – including liability 
suits for the breach of directors’ duty of loyalty – than making the 
funding excessively burdensome and time-consuming ex ante115. In 
short, there is an inevitable trade-off between minority protection 
and controller rights116, and the optimal balance changes with the 
economic scenario. 
To conclude, in dealing with RPTs, it is essential to acknowledge the 
strong interdependency of RPTs regulation with economic 
development. More broadly, the law has a rolling relationship with 
the economy, as they constantly react to one another117. On one side, 
each crisis prompts institutional reactions, and the law should 
continuously adapt and respond to changes in the economy118. Not 
only does the economy functions differently in deep recessions than 
in ordinary times, but the laws also cause one set of effects in deep 
recessions and a different set of effects other times119. On another 
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side, the law is essential to economic development, and it can affect 
economic outcomes120.  
RPTs regulation during a crisis reflects this highly iterative process 
of action and strategic reaction with economic changes. The COVID-
19 crisis, in particular, has highlighted how the rules on RPTs do not 
have the function of protecting outsiders' rights solely, but they can 
also play a role in support of economic activity. Therefore, RPTs 
regulation should be structured in a flexible way to achieve both of 
these roles and to shift from one to another as the economy changes.  
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